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Abstract
We introduce Information Bearing Relation Systems (IBRS) as an abstraction of many logical
systems. We then define a general semantics for IBRS, and show that a special case of IBRS generalizes
in a very natural way preferential semantics and solves open representation problems for weak logical
systems. This is possible, as we can ”break” the strong coherence properties of preferential structures
by higher arrows, i.e. arrows, which do not go to points, but to arrows themselves.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Our aim is twofold here. We want to
(1) introduce IBRS, an abstraction of many semantical structures in nonclassical logics
(2) use IBRS as a generalization of preferential structures to give weaker than preferential logics a
semantics.
Many semantical structures for nonclassical logics use sets of models, called possible worlds, together
with a relation, e.g. accessibility in the case of Kripke models for modal logic, distance in the case of
Stalnaker-Lewis semantics for counterfactual conditionals, or comparison of “normality” in the case of
preferential structures. IBRS allow not only relations between objects, i.e. possible worlds, but also
“higher” relations, where e.g. an object can be in relation with a pair of objects (which are in a “lower”
relation), etc.
It is sometimes natural to see the (basic) relations as attacks: if a ≺ b, then a is considered more “normal”
(or less ′′abnormal′′) than b, or, we may say that a attacks b’s normality, and we may write this as an
arrow from a to b. When we have now an attack from c against this arrow, i.e. the relation a ≺ b, it is
natural to see now the original attack as destroyed, i.e. a does not attack b any more. So a ≺ b is still
there, but without any effect. This is possible in an IBRS, see Diagram 1.1.
2
Diagram 1.1
a
b
c X
Y
Attacking an arrow
The decisive property of preferential structures is the trivial fact that if a, b ∈ X ⊆ Y, and a ≺ b “in X ′′,
then this will also hold ”in Y ′′. This creates strong coherence properties. IBRS can break them: suppose
c ∈ Y−X, and c attacks a ≺ b, then a ≺ b is still there in Y, but not effective any more. Thus, IBRS, or
generalized preferential structures, as we will call this variant of IBRS, can give a semantics to weaker
than preferential logics.
Preferential structures themselves were introduced as abstractions of Circumscription independently in
[Sho87b] and [BS85]. A precise definition of these structures is given below in Definition 3.5.
In an abstract consideration of desirable properties a logic might have, [Gab85] examined rules a non-
monotonic consequence relation ∼| should satisfy:
(1) ∆, α ∼| α,
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(2) ∆ ∼| α ⇒ (∆ ∼| β ⇔ ∆, α ∼| β).
Both, the semantic and the syntactic, approaches were connected in [KLM90], where a representation
theorem was proved, showing that the (stronger than Gabbay′s) system P corresponds to “smooth”
preferential structures. System P consists of
(1) φ ∼| ψ, φ ∼| ψ′ ⇒ φ ∼| ψ ∧ ψ′,
(2) φ ∼| ψ, φ′ ∼| ψ ⇒ φ ∨ φ′ ∼| ψ,
(3) ⊢ φ↔ φ′ ⇒ (φ ∼| ψ ⇔ φ′ ∼| ψ),
(4) φ ∼| ψ, ⊢ ψ → ψ′ ⇒ φ ∼| ψ′,
(5) ⊢ φ→ φ′ ⇒ φ ∼| φ′,
(6) φ ∼| ψ ⇒ (φ ∼| ψ′ ⇔ φ ∧ ψ ∼| ψ′).
where ⊢ is classical provability.
Details can be found in Definition 3.4.
To the authors’ knowledge, a precise semantics for Gabbay’s system was still lacking. We will give it
here, applying the idea of IBRS, which allow to “break” the relations of preferential structures, and thus
their strong coherence conditions, as was already illustrated above.
We will also see that the usual definition of “smoothness” - for every arrow from a to b, there has to be
an arrow from a′ to b, where a′ is a minimal element - is stronger than needed, and a weaker variant,
“essential smoothness” (see Definition 3.14) is sufficient to generate the desired property of cumulativity
on the logical side.
1.2 Introduction to IBRS
The human agent in his daily activity has to deal with many situations involving change. Chief among
them are the following
(1) Common sense reasoning from available data. This involves predication of what unavailable data is
supposed to be (nonmonotonic deduction) but it is a defeasible prediction, geared towards immedi-
ate change. This is formally known as nonmonotonic reasoning and is studied by the nonmonotonic
community.
(2) Belief revision, studied by a very large community. The agent is unhappy with the totality of his
beliefs which he finds internally unacceptable (usually logically inconsistent but not necessarily so)
and needs to change/revise it.
(3) Receiving and updating his data, studied by the update community.
(4) Making morally correct decisions, studied by the deontic logic community.
(5) Dealing with hypothetical and counterfactual situations. This is studied by a large community of
philosophers and AI researchers.
(6) Considering temporal future possibilities, this is covered by modal and temporal logic.
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(7) Dealing with properties that persist through time in the near future and with reasoning that is
constructive. This is covered by intuitionistic logic.
All the above types of reasoning exist in the human mind and are used continuously and coherently every
hour of the day. The formal modelling of these types is done by diverse communities which are largely
distinct with no significant communication or cooperation. The formal models they use are very similar
and arise from a more general theory, what we might call:
“Reasoning with information bearing binary relations”.
Definition 1.1
(1) An information bearing binary relation frame IBR, has the form (S,ℜ), where S is a non-empty set
and ℜ is a subset of S, where S is defined by induction as follows:
(1.1) S0 = S
(1.2) Sn+1 = Sn ∪ (Sn × Sn).
(1.3) S =
⋃
{Sn : n ∈ ω}
We call elements from S points or nodes, and elements from ℜ arrows. Given (S,ℜ), we also set
P ((S,ℜ)) := S, and A((S,ℜ)) := ℜ.
If α is an arrow, the origin and destination of α are defined as usual, and we write α : x→ y when
x is the origin, and y the destination of the arrow α. We also write o(α) and d(α) for the origin and
destination of α.
(2) Let Q be a set of atoms, and L be a set of labels (usually {0, 1} or [0, 1]). An information assignment
h on (S,ℜ) is a function h : Q×ℜ → L.
(3) An information bearing system IBRS, has the form (S,ℜ, h,Q,L), where S, ℜ, h, Q, L are as above.
See Diagram 1.2 for an illustration.
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Diagram 1.2
a d
(p, q) = (1, 0)(p, q) = (0, 0)
c
(p, q) = (1, 1)
e
(p, q) = (0, 1)(p, q) = (0, 1)
b
(p, q) = (1, 1)
(p, q) = (1, 1)
(p, q) = (1, 1)
(p, q) = (1, 1)
(p, q) = (1, 1)
(p, q) = (1, 1)
A simple example of an information bearing system.
We have here:
S = {a, b, c, d, e}.
ℜ = S ∪ {(a, b), (a, c), (d, c), (d, e)} ∪ {((a, b), (d, c)), (d, (a, c))}.
Q = {p, q}
The values of h for p and q are as indicated in the figure. For example h(p, (d, (a, c))) = 1.
Comment 1.1
The elements in Figure Diagram 1.2 can be interpreted in many ways, depending on the area of applica-
tion.
(1) The points in S can be interpreted as possible worlds, or as nodes in an argumentation network or
nodes in a neural net or states, etc.
(2) The direct arrows from nodes to nodes can be interpreted as accessibility relation, attack or support
arrows in an argumentation networks, connection in a neural nets, a preferential ordering in a
nonmonotonic model, etc.
(3) The labels on the nodes and arrows can be interpreted as fuzzy values in the accessibility relation
or weights in the neural net or strength of arguments and their attack in argumentation nets, or
distances in a counterfactual model, etc.
(4) The double arrows can be interpreted as feedback loops to nodes or to connections.
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Thus, IBRS can be used as a source of information for various logics based on the atoms in Q. We now
illustrate by listing several such logics.
Modal Logic
One can consider the figure as giving rise to two modal logic models. One with actual world a and one
with d, these being the two minimal points of the relation. Consider a language with q. how do we
evaluate a |= q?
The modal logic will have to give an algorithm for calculating the values.
Say we choose algorithm A1 for a |= q, namely:
[ A1(a,q) = 1 ] iff for all x ∈ S such that a = x or (a, x) ∈ ℜ we have h(q, x) = 1.
According to A1 we get that q is false at a. A1 gives rise to a T−modal logic. Note that the reflexivity
is not anchored at the relation ℜ of the network but in the algorithm A1 in the way we evaluate. We say
(S,ℜ, . . . .) |=  q iff q holds in all minimal points of (S,ℜ).
For orderings without minimal points we may choose a subset of distinguished points.
Nonmonotonic Deduction
We can ask whether p ∼| q according to algorithm A2 defined below. A2 says that p ∼| q holds iff q holds
in all minimal models of p. Let us check the value of A2 in this case:
Let Sp = {s ∈ S | h(p, s) = 1}. Thus Sp = {d, e}.
The minimal points of Sp are {d}. Since h(q, d) = 0, we have that p 6∼| q.
Note that in the cases of modal logic and nonmonotonic logic we ignored the arrows (d, (a, c)) (i.e. the
double arrow from d to the arc (a, c)) and the h values to arcs. These values do not play a part in the
traditional modal or nonmonotonic logic. They do play a part in other logics. The attentive reader may
already suspect that we have her an opportunity for generalisation of say nonmonotonic logic, by giving
a role to arc annotations.
Argumentation Nets
Here the nodes of S are interpreted as arguments. The atoms {p, q} can be interpreted as types of
arguments and the arrows e.g. (a, b) ∈ ℜ as indicating that the argument a is attacking the argument b.
So, for example, let
a = we must win votes.
b = death sentence for murderers.
c = We must allow abortion for teenagers
d = Bible forbids taking of life.
q = the argument is a social argument
p = the argument is a religious argument.
(d, (a, c)) = there should be no connection between winning votes and abortion.
((a, b), (d, c)) = If we attack the death sentence in order to win votes then we must stress
(attack) that there should be no connection between religion (Bible) and social issues.
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Thus we have according to this model that supporting abortion can lose votes. The argument for abortion
is a social one and the argument from the Bible against it is a religious one.
We can extract information from this IBRS using two algorithms. The modal logic one can check whether
for example every social argument is attacked by a religious argument. The answer is no, since the social
argument b is attacked only by a which is not a religious argument.
We can also use algorithm A3 (following Dung) to extract the winning arguments of this system. The
arguments a and d are winning since they are not attacked. d attacks the connection between a and c
(i.e. stops a attacking c).
The attack of a on b is successful and so b is out. However the arc (a, b) attacks the arc (d, c). So c is not
attacked at all as both arcs leading into it are successfully eliminated. So c is in. e is out because it is
attacked by d.
So the winning arguments are {a, c, d}
In this model we ignore the annotations on arcs. To be consistent in our mathematics we need to say
that h is a partial function on ℜ. The best way is to give more specific definition on IBRS to make it
suitable for each logic.
Counterfactuals
The traditional semantics for counterfactuals involves closeness of worlds. The clauses y |= p →֒ q, where
→֒ is a counterfactual implication is that q holds in all worlds y′ “near enough” to y in which p holds.
So if we interpret the annotation on arcs as distances then we can define “near” as distance ≤ 2, we get:
a |= p →֒ q iff in all worlds of p−distance ≤ 2 if p holds so does q. Note that the distance depends on p.
In this case we get that a |= p →֒ q holds. The distance function can also use the arrows from arcs to
arcs, etc. There are many opportunities for generalisation in our IBRS set up.
Intuitionistic Persistence
We can get an intuitionistic Kripke model out of this IBRS by letting, for t, s ∈ S, tρ0s iff t = s or
[tRs ∧ ∀q ∈ Q(h(q, t) ≤ h(q, s))]. We get that
[ r0 = {(y, y) | y ∈ S} ∪ {(a, b), (a, c), (d, e)}. ]
Let ρ be the transitive closure of ρ0. Algorithm A4 evaluates p⇒ q in this model, where⇒ is intuitionistic
implication.
A4 : p⇒ q holds at the IBRS iff p⇒ q holds intuitionistically at every ρ−minimal point of(S, ρ).
1.3 Purpose of this paper
In this paper, we will not cover all these applications of the above abstract definition of IBRS, but will
(1) give an abstract and also a very concrete semantics to IBRS
(2) show that a special case of IBRS generalizes in a very natural way preferential semantics and solves
open representation problems for weak logical systems. This is possible, as we can “break” the strong
coherence properties of preferential structures by higher arrows, i.e. arrows, which do not go to points,
but to arrows themselves.
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2 A semantics for IBRS
2.1 Introduction
(1) Nodes and arrows
As we may have counterarguments not only against nodes, but also against arrows, they must be treated
basically the same way, i.e. in some way there has to be a positive, but also a negative influence on both.
So arrows cannot just be concatenation between the contents of nodes, or so.
We will differentiate between nodes and arrows by labelling arrows in addition with a time delay. We see
nodes as situations, where the output is computed instantenously from the input, whereas arrows describe
some “force” or “mechanism” which may need some time to “compute” the result from the input.
Consequently, if α is an arrow, and β an arrow pointing to α, then it should point to the input of α, i.e.
before the time lapse. Conversely, any arrow originating in α should originate after the time lapse.
Apart this distinction, we will treat nodes and arrows the same way, so the following discussion will apply
to both - which we call just “objects”.
(2) Defeasibility
The general idea is to code each object, say X, by I(X) : U(X) → C(X) : If I(X) holds then, unless
U(X) holds, consequence C(X) will hold. (We adopted Reiter’s notation for defaults, as IBRS have
common points with the former.)
The situation is slightly more complicated, as there can be several counterarguments, so U(X) really is
an “or”. Likewise, there can be several supporting arguments, so I(X) also is an “or”.
A counterargument must not always be an argument against a specific supporting argument, but it can
be. Thus, we should admit both possibilties. As we can use arrows to arrows, the second case is easy to
treat (as is the dual, a supporting argument can be against a specific counterargument). How do we treat
the case of unspecific pro- and counterarguments? Probably the easiest way is to adopt Dung’s idea:
an object is in, if it has at least one support, and no counterargument - see [Dun95]. Of course, other
possibilities may be adopted, counting, use of labels, etc., but we just consider the simple case here.
(3) Labels
In the general case, objects stand for some kind of defeasible transmission. We may in some cases see
labels as restricting this transmission to certain values. For instance, if the label is p = 1 and q = 0, then
the p−part may be transmitted and the q−part not.
Thus, a transmission with a label can sometimes be considered as a family of transmissions, which ones
are active is indicated by the label.
Example 2.1
In fuzzy Kripke models, labels are elements of [0, 1]. p = 0.5 as label for a node m′ which stands for a
fuzzy model means that the value of p is 0.5. p = 0.5 as label for an arrow from m to m′ means that p is
transmitted with value 0.5. Thus, when we look from m to m′, we see p with value 0.5 ∗ 0.5 = 0.25. So,
we have ♦p with value 0.25 at m - if, e.g., m,m′ are the only models.
(4) Putting things together
If an arrow leaves an object, the object’s output will be connected to the (only) positive input of the
arrow. (An arrow has no negative inputs from objects it leaves.) If a positive arrow enters an object, it
is connected to one of the positive inputs of the object, analogously for negative arrows and inputs.
When labels are present, they are transmitted through some operation.
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2.2 Formal definition
Definition 2.1
In the most general case, objects of IBRS have the form: (< I1, L1 >, . . . , < In, Ln >) : (< U1, L
′
1 >
, . . . , < Un, L
′
n >), where the Li, L
′
i are labels and the Ii, Ui might be just truth values, but can also be
more complicated, a (possibly infinite) sequence of some values. Connected objects have, of course, to
have corresponding such sequences. In addition, the object X has a criterion for each input, whether it is
valid or not (in the simple case, this will just be the truth value ′′true′′). If there is at least one positive
valid input Ii, and no valid negative input Ui, then the output C(X) and its label are calculated on the
basis of the valid inputs and their labels. If the object is an arrow, this will take some time, t, otherwise,
this is instantaneous.
Evaluating a diagram
An evaluation is relative to a fixed input, i.e. some objects will be given certain values, and the diagram
is left to calculate the others. It may well be that it oscillates, i.e. shows a cyclic behaviour. This may
be true for a subset of the diagram, or the whole diagram. If it is restricted to an unimportant part, we
might neglect this. Whether it oscillates or not can also depend on the time delays of the arrows (see
Example 2.2).
We therefore define for a diagram ∆
α ∼| ∆β iff
(a) α is a (perhaps partial) input - where the other values are set “not valid”
(b) β is a (perhaps partial) output
(c) after some time, β is stable, i.e. all still possible oscillations do not affect β
(d) the other possible input values do not matter, i.e. whatever the input, the result is the same.
In the cases examined here more closely, all input values will be defined.
2.3 A circuit semantics for simple IBRS without labels
It is standard to implement the usual logical connectives by electronic circuits. These components are
called gates. Circuits with feedback sometimes show undesirable behaviour when the initial conditions
are not specified. (When we switch a circuit on, the outputs of the individual gates can have arbitrary
values.) The technical realization of these initial values shows the way to treat defaults. The initial values
are set via resistors (in the order of 1 kΩ) between the point in the circuit we want to intialize and the
desired tension (say 0 Volt for false, 5 Volt for true). They are called pull-down or pull-up resistors (for
default 0 or 5 Volt). When a “real” result comes in, it will override the tension applied via the resistor.
Closer inspection reveals that we have here a 3 level default situation: The initial value will be the
weakest, which can be overridden by any “real” signal, but a positive argument can be overridden by a
negative one. Thus, the biggest resistor will be for the initialization, the smaller one for the supporting
arguments, and the negative arguments have full power.
Technical details will be left to the experts.
We give now an example which shows that the delays of the arrows can matter. In one situation, a stable
state is reached, in another, the circuit begins to oscillate.
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Example 2.2
(In engineering terms, this is a variant of a JK flip-flop with R ∗ S = 0, a circuit with feedback.)
We have 8 measuring points.
In1, In2 are the overall input, Out1, Out2 the overall output, A1, A2, A3, A4 are auxiliary internal points.
All points can be true or false.
The logical structure is as follows:
A1 = In1 ∧Out1, A2 = In2 ∧Out2,
A3 = A1 ∨Out2, A4 = A2 ∨Out1,
Out1 = ¬A3, Out2 = ¬A4.
Thus, the circuit is symmetrical, with In1 corresponding to In2, A1 to A2, A3 to A4, Out1 to Out2.
The input is held constant. See Diagram 2.1.
Diagram 2.1
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∧
A1 ∨
A3
¬
In1
Out1
∧
A2 ∨
A4
¬
In2
Out2
Gate Semantics
We suppose that the output of the individual gates is present n time slices after the input was present.
n will in the first circuit be equal to 1 for all gates, in the second circuit equal to 1 for all but the AND
gates, which will take 2 time slices. Thus, in both cases, e.g. Out1 at time t will be the negation of A3
at time t − 1. In the first case, A1 at time t will be the conjunction of In1 and Out1 at time t− 1, and
in the second case the conjunction of In1 and Out1 at time t− 2.
We initialize In1 as true, all others as false. (The initial value of A3 and A4 does not matter, the behaviour
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is essentially the same for all such values.)
The first circuit will oscillate with a period of 4, the second circuit will go to a stable state.
We have the following transition tables (time slice shown at left):
Circuit 1, delay = 1 everywhere:
In1 In2 A1 A2 A3 A4 Out1 Out2
1: T F F F F F F F
2: T F F F F F T T
3: T F T F T T T T
4: T F T F T T F F
5: T F F F T F F F oscillation starts
6: T F F F F F F T
7: T F F F T F T T
8: T F T F T T F T
9: T F F F T F F F back to start of oscillation
Circuit 2, delay = 1 everywhere, except for AND with delay = 2 :
(Thus, A1 and A2 are held at their intial value up to time 2, then they are calculated using the values of
time t− 2.)
In1 In2 A1 A2 A3 A4 Out1 Out2
1: T F F F F F F F
2: T F F F F F T T
3: T F F F T T T T
4: T F T F T T F F
5: T F T F T F F F
6: T F F F T F F T stable state reached
7: T F F F T F F T
Note that state 6 of circuit 2 is also stable in circuit 1, but it is never reached in that circuit.
3 IBRS as generalized preferential structures
3.1 Introduction
Definition 3.1
We use P to denote the power set operator, Π{Xi : i ∈ I} := {g : g : I →
⋃
{Xi : i ∈ I}, ∀i ∈
I.g(i) ∈ Xi} is the general cartesian product, card(X) shall denote the cardinality of X, and V the
set-theoretic universe we work in - the class of all sets. Given a set of pairs X , and a set X, we denote by
X⌈X := {< x, i >∈ X : x ∈ X}. When the context is clear, we will sometime simply write X for X⌈X.
A ⊆ B will denote that A is a subset of B or equal to B, and A ⊂ B that A is a proper subset of B,
likewise for A ⊇ B and A ⊃ B.
Given some fixed set U we work in, and X ⊆ U, then C(X) := U −X .
If Y ⊆ P(X) for some X, we say that Y satisfies
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(∩) iff it is closed under finite intersections,
(
⋂
) iff it is closed under arbitrary intersections,
(∪) iff it is closed under finite unions,
(
⋃
) iff it is closed under arbitrary unions,
(C) iff it is closed under complementation.
We will sometimes write A = B ‖ C for: A = B, or A = C, or A = B ∪ C.
We make ample and tacit use of the Axiom of Choice.
Definition 3.2
≺∗ will denote the transitive closure of the relation ≺ . If a relation <, ≺, or similar is given, a⊥b will
express that a and b are < − (or ≺ −) incomparable - context will tell. Given any relation <, ≤ will
stand for < or =, conversely, given ≤, < will stand for ≤, but not =, similarly for ≺ etc.
Definition 3.3
We work here in a classical propositional language L, a theory T will be an arbitrary set of formulas.
Formulas will often be named φ, ψ, etc., theories T, S, etc.
v(L) will be the set of propositional variables of L.
ML will be the set of (classical) models of L, M(T ) or MT is the set of models of T, likewise M(φ) for a
formula φ.
DL := {M(T ) : T a theory in L}, the set of definable model sets.
Note that, in classical propositional logic, ∅,ML ∈ DL, DL contains singletons, is closed under arbitrary
intersections and finite unions.
An operation f : Y → P(ML) for Y ⊆ P(ML) is called definability preserving, (dp) or (µdp) in short, iff
for all X ∈ DL ∩ Y f(X) ∈ DL.
We will also use (µdp) for binary functions f : Y ×Y → P(ML) - as needed for theory revision - with the
obvious meaning.
⊢ will be classical derivability, and
T := {φ : T ⊢ φ}, the closure of T under ⊢ .
Con(.) will stand for classical consistency, so Con(φ) will mean that φ is clasical consistent, likewise for
Con(T ). Con(T, T ′) will stand for Con(T ∪ T ′), etc.
Given a consequence relation ∼| , we define
T := {φ : T ∼| φ}.
(There is no fear of confusion with T , as it just is not useful to close twice under classical logic.)
T ∨ T ′ := {φ ∨ φ′ : φ ∈ T, φ′ ∈ T ′}.
If X ⊆ML, then Th(X) := {φ : X |= φ}, likewise for Th(m), m ∈ML.
We recollect and note:
Fact 3.1
Let L be a fixed propositional language, DL ⊆ X, µ : X → P(ML), for a L−theory T T := Th(µ(MT )),
let T, T ′ be arbitrary theories, then:
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(1) µ(MT ) ⊆M
T
,
(2) MT ∪MT ′ =MT∨T ′ and MT∪T ′ =MT ∩MT ′ ,
(3) µ(MT ) = ∅ ↔ ⊥ ∈ T .
If µ is definability preserving or µ(MT ) is finite, then the following also hold:
(4) µ(MT ) =M
T
,
(5) T ′ ⊢ T ↔ MT ′ ⊆ µ(MT ),
(6) µ(MT ) =MT ′ ↔ T ′ = T . 
Definition 3.4
We introduce here formally a list of properties of set functions on the algebraic side, and their corre-
sponding logical rules on the other side.
Recall that T := {φ : T ⊢ φ}, T := {φ : T ∼| φ}, where ⊢ is classical consequence, and ∼| any other
consequence.
We show, wherever adequate, in parallel the formula version in the left column, the theory version in
the middle column, and the semantical or algebraic counterpart in the right column. The algebraic
counterpart gives conditions for a function f : Y → P(U), where U is some set, and Y ⊆ P(U).
When the formula version is not commonly used, we omit it, as we normally work only with the theory
version.
Intuitively, A and B in the right hand side column stand for M(φ) for some formula φ, whereas X , Y
stand for M(T ) for some theory T .
15
Basics
(AND) (AND) Closure under
φ ∼| ψ, φ ∼| ψ′ ⇒ T ∼| ψ, T ∼| ψ′ ⇒ finite
φ ∼| ψ ∧ ψ′ T ∼| ψ ∧ ψ′ intersection
(OR) (OR) (µOR)
φ ∼| ψ, φ′ ∼| ψ ⇒ T ∩ T ′ ⊆ T ∨ T ′ f(X ∪ Y ) ⊆ f(X) ∪ f(Y )
φ ∨ φ′ ∼| ψ
(wOR) (wOR) (µwOR)
φ ∼| ψ, φ′ ⊢ ψ ⇒ T ∩ T ′ ⊆ T ∨ T ′ f(X ∪ Y ) ⊆ f(X) ∪ Y
φ ∨ φ′ ∼| ψ
(disjOR) (disjOR) (µdisjOR)
φ ⊢ ¬φ′, φ ∼| ψ, ¬Con(T ∪ T ′)⇒ X ∩ Y = ∅ ⇒
φ′ ∼| ψ ⇒ φ ∨ φ′ ∼| ψ T ∩ T ′ ⊆ T ∨ T ′ f(X ∪ Y ) ⊆ f(X) ∪ f(Y )
(LLE) (LLE)
Left Logical Equivalence
⊢ φ↔ φ′, φ ∼| ψ ⇒ T = T ′ ⇒ T = T ′ trivially true
φ′ ∼| ψ
(RW ) Right Weakening (RW ) upward closure
φ ∼| ψ,⊢ ψ → ψ′ ⇒ T ∼| ψ,⊢ ψ → ψ′ ⇒
φ ∼| ψ′ T ∼| ψ′
(CCL) Classical Closure (CCL)
T is classically trivially true
closed
(SC) Supraclassicality (SC) (µ ⊆)
φ ⊢ ψ ⇒ φ ∼| ψ T ⊆ T f(X) ⊆ X
(REF ) Reflexivity
∆, α ∼| α
(CP ) (CP ) (µ∅)
Consistency Preservation
φ ∼| ⊥ ⇒ φ ⊢ ⊥ T ∼| ⊥ ⇒ T ⊢ ⊥ f(X) = ∅ ⇒ X = ∅
(µ∅fin)
X 6= ∅ ⇒ f(X) 6= ∅
for finite X
(PR) (µPR)
φ ∧ φ′ ⊆ φ ∪ {φ′} T ∪ T ′ ⊆ T ∪ T ′ X ⊆ Y ⇒
f(Y ) ∩X ⊆ f(X)
(µPR′)
f(X) ∩ Y ⊆ f(X ∩ Y )
(CUT ) (CUT ) (µCUT )
∆ ∼| α;∆, α ∼| β ⇒ T ⊆ T ′ ⊆ T ⇒ f(X) ⊆ Y ⊆ X ⇒
∆ ∼| β T ′ ⊆ T f(X) ⊆ f(Y )
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Cumulativity
(CM) Cautious Monotony (CM) (µCM)
φ ∼| ψ, φ ∼| ψ′ ⇒ T ⊆ T ′ ⊆ T ⇒ f(X) ⊆ Y ⊆ X ⇒
φ ∧ ψ ∼| ψ′ T ⊆ T ′ f(Y ) ⊆ f(X)
or (ResM) Restricted Monotony (µResM)
∆ ∼| α, β ⇒ ∆, α ∼| β f(X) ⊆ A ∩B ⇒ f(X ∩ A) ⊆ B
(CUM) Cumulativity (CUM) (µCUM)
φ ∼| ψ ⇒ T ⊆ T ′ ⊆ T ⇒ f(X) ⊆ Y ⊆ X ⇒
(φ ∼| ψ′ ⇔ φ ∧ ψ ∼| ψ′) T = T ′ f(Y ) = f(X)
(⊆⊇) (µ ⊆⊇)
T ⊆ T ′, T ′ ⊆ T ⇒ f(X) ⊆ Y, f(Y ) ⊆ X ⇒
T ′ = T f(X) = f(Y )
Rationality
(RatM) Rational Monotony (RatM) (µRatM)
φ ∼| ψ, φ 6∼| ¬ψ′ ⇒ Con(T ∪ T ′), T ⊢ T ′ ⇒ X ⊆ Y,X ∩ f(Y ) 6= ∅ ⇒
φ ∧ ψ′ ∼| ψ T ⊇ T ′ ∪ T f(X) ⊆ f(Y ) ∩X
(RatM =) (µ =)
Con(T ∪ T ′), T ⊢ T ′ ⇒ X ⊆ Y,X ∩ f(Y ) 6= ∅ ⇒
T = T ′ ∪ T f(X) = f(Y ) ∩X
(Log =′) (µ =′)
Con(T ′ ∪ T ) ⇒ f(Y ) ∩X 6= ∅ ⇒
T ∪ T ′ = T ′ ∪ T f(Y ∩X) = f(Y ) ∩X
(Log ‖) (µ ‖)
T ∨ T ′ is one of f(X ∪ Y ) is one of
T, or T ′, or T ∩ T ′ (by (CCL)) f(X), f(Y ) or f(X) ∪ f(Y )
(Log∪) (µ∪)
Con(T ′ ∪ T ), ¬Con(T ′ ∪ T ) ⇒ f(Y ) ∩ (X − f(X)) 6= ∅ ⇒
¬Con(T ∨ T ′ ∪ T ′) f(X ∪ Y ) ∩ Y = ∅
(Log∪′) (µ∪′)
Con(T ′ ∪ T ), ¬Con(T ′ ∪ T ) ⇒ f(Y ) ∩ (X − f(X)) 6= ∅ ⇒
T ∨ T ′ = T f(X ∪ Y ) = f(X)
(µ ∈)
a ∈ X − f(X) ⇒
∃b ∈ X.a 6∈ f({a, b})
(PR) is also called infinite conditionalization - we choose the name for its central role for preferential
structures (PR) or (µPR).
The system of rules (AND) (OR) (LLE) (RW ) (SC) (CP ) (CM) (CUM) is also called system P (for
preferential), adding (RatM) gives the system R (for rationality or rankedness).
Roughly: Smooth preferential structures generate logics satisfying system P , ranked structures logics
satisfying system R.
A logic satisfying (REF ), (ResM), and (CUT ) is called a consequence relation.
(LLE) and(CCL) will hold automatically, whenever we work with model sets.
(AND) is obviously closely related to filters, and corresponds to closure under finite intersections. (RW )
corresponds to upward closure of filters.
More precisely, validity of both depend on the definition, and the direction we consider.
Given f and (µ ⊆), f(X) ⊆ X generates a pricipal filter: {X ′ ⊆ X : f(X) ⊆ X ′}, with the definition: If
X =M(T ), then T ∼| φ iff f(X) ⊆M(φ). Validity of (AND) and (RW ) are then trivial.
Conversely, we can define for X =M(T )
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X := {X ′ ⊆ X : ∃φ(X ′ = X ∩M(φ) and T ∼| φ)}.
(AND) then makes X closed under finite intersections, (RW ) makes X upward closed. This is in the
infinite case usually not yet a filter, as not all subsets of X need to be definable this way. In this case,
we complete X by adding all X ′′ such that there is X ′ ⊆ X ′′ ⊆ X , X ′ ∈ X .
Alternatively, we can define
X := {X ′ ⊆ X :
⋂
{X ∩M(φ) : T ∼| φ} ⊆ X ′}.
(SC) corresponds to the choice of a subset.
(CP ) is somewhat delicate, as it presupposes that the chosen model set is non-empty. This might fail in
the presence of ever better choices, without ideal ones; the problem is addressed by the limit versions.
(PR) is an infinitary version of one half of the deduction theorem: Let T stand for φ, T ′ for ψ, and
φ ∧ ψ ∼| σ, so φ ∼| ψ → σ, but (ψ → σ) ∧ ψ ⊢ σ.
(CUM) (whose most interesting half in our context is (CM)) may best be seen as normal use of lemmas:
We have worked hard and found some lemmas. Now we can take a rest, and come back again with our
new lemmas. Adding them to the axioms will neither add new theorems, nor prevent old ones to hold.
Fact 3.2
This table is to be read as follows: If the left hand side holds for some function f : Y → P(U), and the
auxiliary properties noted in the middle also hold for f or Y, then the right hand side will hold, too -
and conversely.
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Basics
(1.1) (µPR) ⇒ (∩) + (µ ⊆) (µPR′)
(1.2) ⇐
(2.1) (µPR) ⇒ (µ ⊆) (µOR)
(2.2) ⇐ (µ ⊆) + closure
under set difference
(3) (µPR) ⇒ (µCUT )
(4) (µ ⊆) + (µ ⊆⊇) + (µCUM)+ 6⇒ (µPR)
(µRatM) + (∩)
Cumulativity
(5.1) (µCM) ⇒ (∩) + (µ ⊆) (µResM)
(5.2) ⇐ (infin.)
(6) (µCM) + (µCUT ) ⇔ (µCUM)
(7) (µ ⊆) + (µ ⊆⊇) ⇒ (µCUM)
(8) (µ ⊆) + (µCUM) + (∩) ⇒ (µ ⊆⊇)
(9) (µ ⊆) + (µCUM) 6⇒ (µ ⊆⊇)
Rationality
(10) (µRatM) + (µPR) ⇒ (µ =)
(11) (µ =) ⇒ (µPR),
(12.1) (µ =) ⇒ (∩) + (µ ⊆) (µ =′),
(12.2) ⇐
(13) (µ ⊆), (µ =) ⇒ (∪) (µ∪),
(14) (µ ⊆), (µ∅), (µ =) ⇒ (∪) (µ ‖), (µ∪′), (µCUM),
(15) (µ ⊆) + (µ ‖) ⇒ Y closed under set difference (µ =),
(16) (µ ‖) + (µ ∈) + (µPR)+ ⇒ (∪) + Y contains singletons (µ =),
(µ ⊆)
(17) (µCUM) + (µ =) ⇒ (∪) + Y contains singletons (µ ∈),
(18) (µCUM) + (µ =) + (µ ⊆) ⇒ (∪) (µ ‖),
(19) (µPR) + (µCUM) + (µ ‖) ⇒ sufficient, e.g. true in DL (µ =).
(20) (µ ⊆) + (µPR) + (µ =) 6⇒ (µ ‖),
(21) (µ ⊆) + (µPR) + (µ ‖) 6⇒ (without closure (µ =)
under set difference),
(22) (µ ⊆) + (µPR) + (µ ‖)+ 6⇒ (µ ∈)
(µ =) + (µ∪) (thus not representability
by ranked structures)
Proposition 3.3
The following table is to be read as follows:
Let a logic ∼| satisfies (LLE) and (CCL), and define a function f : DL → DL by f(M(T )) := M(T ).
Then f is well defined, satisfies (µdp), and T = Th(f(M(T ))).
If ∼| satisfies a rule in the left hand side, then - provided the additional properties noted in the middle
for ⇒ hold, too - f will satisfy the property in the right hand side.
Conversely, if f : Y → P(ML) is a function, with DL ⊆ Y, and we define a logic ∼| by T := Th(f(M(T ))),
then ∼| satisfies (LLE) and (CCL). If f satisfies (µdp), then f(M(T )) =M(T ).
If f satisfies a property in the right hand side, then - provided the additional properties noted in the
middle for ⇐ hold, too - ∼| will satisfy the property in the left hand side.
If “formula” is noted in the table, this means that, if one of the theories (the one named the same way
in Definition 3.4) is equivalent to a formula, we can renounce on (µdp).
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Basics
(1.1) (OR) ⇒ (µOR)
(1.2) ⇐
(2.1) (disjOR) ⇒ (µdisjOR)
(2.2) ⇐
(3.1) (wOR) ⇒ (µwOR)
(3.2) ⇐
(4.1) (SC) ⇒ (µ ⊆)
(4.2) ⇐
(5.1) (CP ) ⇒ (µ∅)
(5.2) ⇐
(6.1) (PR) ⇒ (µPR)
(6.2) ⇐ (µdp) + (µ ⊆)
(6.3) 6⇐ without (µdp)
(6.4) ⇐ (µ ⊆)
T ′ a formula
(6.5) (PR) ⇐ (µPR′)
T ′ a formula
(7.1) (CUT ) ⇒ (µCUT )
(7.2) ⇐
Cumulativity
(8.1) (CM) ⇒ (µCM)
(8.2) ⇐
(9.1) (ResM) ⇒ (µResM)
(9.2) ⇐
(10.1) (⊆⊇) ⇒ (µ ⊆⊇)
(10.2) ⇐
(11.1) (CUM) ⇒ (µCUM)
(11.2) ⇐
Rationality
(12.1) (RatM) ⇒ (µRatM)
(12.2) ⇐ (µdp)
(12.3) 6⇐ without (µdp)
(12.4) ⇐
T a formula
(13.1) (RatM =) ⇒ (µ =)
(13.2) ⇐ (µdp)
(13.3) 6⇐ without (µdp)
(13.4) ⇐
T a formula
(14.1) (Log =′) ⇒ (µ =′)
(14.2) ⇐ (µdp)
(14.3) 6⇐ without (µdp)
(14.4) ⇐ T a formula
(15.1) (Log ‖) ⇒ (µ ‖)
(15.2) ⇐
(16.1) (Log∪) ⇒ (µ ⊆) + (µ =) (µ∪)
(16.2) ⇐ (µdp)
(16.3) 6⇐ without (µdp)
(17.1) (Log∪′) ⇒ (µ ⊆) + (µ =) (µ∪′)
(17.2) ⇐ (µdp)
(17.3) 6⇐ without (µdp)
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Definition 3.5
Fix U 6= ∅, and consider arbitrary X. Note that this X has not necessarily anything to do with U, or
U below. Thus, the functions µM below are in principle functions from V to V - where V is the set
theoretical universe we work in.
(A) Preferential models or structures.
(1) The version without copies:
A pairM :=< U,≺> with U an arbitrary set, and ≺ an arbitrary binary relation is called a preferential
model or structure.
(2) The version with copies:
A pair M :=< U ,≺> with U an arbitrary set of pairs, and ≺ an arbitrary binary relation is called a
preferential model or structure.
If < x, i >∈ U , then x is intended to be an element of U, and i the index of the copy.
We sometimes also need copies of the relation ≺, we will then replace ≺ by one or several arrows α
attacking non-minimal elements, e.g. x ≺ y will be written α : x→ y, < x, i >≺< y, i > will be written
α :< x, i >→< y, i >, and finally we might have < α, k >: x→ y and < α, k >:< x, i >→< y, i >, etc.
(B) Minimal elements, the functions µM
(1) The version without copies:
Let M :=< U,≺>, and define
µM(X) := {x ∈ X : x ∈ U ∧ ¬∃x′ ∈ X ∩ U.x′ ≺ x}.
µM(X) is called the set of minimal elements of X (in M).
(2) The version with copies:
Let M :=< U ,≺> be as above. Define
µM(X) := {x ∈ X : ∃ < x, i >∈ U .¬∃ < x
′, i′ >∈ U(x′ ∈ X ∧ < x′, i′ >′≺< x, i >)}.
Again, by abuse of language, we say that µM(X) is the set of minimal elements of X in the structure. If
the context is clear, we will also write just µ.
We sometimes say that < x, i > “kills” or “minimizes” < y, j > if < x, i >≺< y, j > . By abuse of
language we also say a set X kills or minimizes a set Y if for all < y, j >∈ U , y ∈ Y there is < x, i >∈ U ,
x ∈ X s.t. < x, i >≺< y, j > .
M is also called injective or 1-copy, iff there is always at most one copy < x, i > for each x. Note that
the existence of copies corresponds to a non-injective labelling function - as is often used in nonclassical
logic, e.g. modal logic.
We say that M is transitive, irreflexive, etc., iff ≺ is.
Note that µ(X) might well be empty, even if X is not.
Definition 3.6
We define the consequence relation of a preferential structure for a given propositional language L.
(A)
(1) If m is a classical model of a language L, we say by abuse of language
< m, i >|= φ iff m |= φ,
and if X is a set of such pairs, that
21
X |= φ iff for all < m, i >∈ X m |= φ.
(2) IfM is a preferential structure, and X is a set of L−models for a classical propositional language L,
or a set of pairs < m, i >, where the m are such models, we call M a classical preferential structure or
model.
(B)
Validity in a preferential structure, or the semantical consequence relation defined by such a structure:
Let M be as above.
We define:
T |=M φ iff µM(M(T )) |= φ, i.e. µM(M(T )) ⊆M(φ).
M will be called definability preserving iff for all X ∈ DL µM(X) ∈ DL.
As µM is defined on DL, but need by no means always result in some new definable set, this is (and
reveals itself as a quite strong) additional property.
Definition 3.7
Let Y ⊆ P(U). (In applications to logic, Y will be DL.)
A preferential structureM is called Y−smooth iff in every X ∈ Y every element x ∈ X is either minimal
in X or above an element, which is minimal in X. More precisely:
(1) The version without copies:
If x ∈ X ∈ Y, then either x ∈ µ(X) or there is x′ ∈ µ(X).x′ ≺ x.
(2) The version with copies:
If x ∈ X ∈ Y, and < x, i >∈ U , then either there is no < x′, i′ >∈ U , x′ ∈ X, < x′, i′ >≺< x, i >
or there is < x′, i′ >∈ U , < x′, i′ >≺< x, i >, x′ ∈ X, s.t. there is no < x′′, i′′ >∈ U , x′′ ∈ X, with
< x′′, i′′ >≺< x′, i′ > .
When considering the models of a language L, M will be called smooth iff it is DL−smooth; DL is the
default.
Obviously, the richer the set Y is, the stronger the condition Y−smoothness will be.
The following table summarizes representation by not necessarily ranked preferential structures. The
implications on the right are shown in Proposition 3.3 (going via the µ−functions), those on the left are
shown in the respective representation theorems.
µ− function Pref.Structure Logic
(µ ⊆) + (µPR) ⇐ general ⇒ (µdp) (LLE) + (RW ) + (SC) + (PR)
⇒ ⇐
6⇒ without (µdp)
(µ ⊆) + (µPR) ⇐ transitive ⇒ (µdp) (LLE) + (RW ) + (SC) + (PR)
⇒ ⇐
6⇒ without (µdp)
(µ ⊆) + (µPR) + (µCUM) ⇐ smooth ⇒ (µdp) (LLE) + (RW ) + (SC) + (PR)+
(CUM)
⇒ (∪) ⇐ (∪)
6⇒ without (µdp)
(µ ⊆) + (µPR) + (µCUM) ⇐ smooth+transitive ⇒ (µdp) (LLE) + (RW ) + (SC) + (PR)+
(CUM)
⇒ (∪) ⇐ (∪)
6⇒ without (µdp)
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3.2 Generalized preferential structures
3.2.1 Introduction
Comment 3.1
A counterargument to α is NOT an argument for ¬α (this is asking for too much), but just showing one
case where ¬α holds. In preferential structures, an argument for α is a set of level 1 arrows, eliminating
¬α−models. A counterargument is one level 2 arrow, attacking one such level 1 arrow.
Of course, when we have copies, we may need many successful attacks, on all copies, to achieve the goal.
As we may have copies of level 1 arrows, we may need many level 2 arrows to destroy them all.
Definition 3.8
An IBR is called a generalized preferential structure iff the origins of all arrows are points. We will
usually write x, y etc. for points, α, β etc. for arrows.
Definition 3.9
Consider a generalized preferential structure X .
(1) Level n arrow:
Definition by upward induction.
If α : x→ y, x, y are points, then α is a level 1 arrow.
If α : x→ β, x is a point, β a level n arrow, then α is a level n+1 arrow. (o(α) is the origin, d(α) is the
destination of α.)
λ(α) will denote the level of α.
(2) Level n structure:
X is a level n structure iff all arrows in X are at most level n arrows.
We consider here only structures of some arbitrary but finite level n.
(3) We define for an arrow α by induction O(α) and D(α).
If λ(α) = 1, then O(α) := {o(α)}, D(α) := {d(α)}.
If α : x→ β, then D(α) := D(β), and O(α) := {x} ∪O(β).
Thus, for example, if α : x→ y, β : z → α, then O(β) := {x, z}, D(β) = {y}.
We will not consider here diagrams with arbitrarily high levels. One reason is that diagrams like the
following will have an unclear meaning:
Example 3.1
< α, 1 >: x→ y,
< α, n+ 1 >: x→< α, n > (n ∈ ω).
Is y ∈ µ(X)?
Definition 3.10
Let X be a generalized preferential structure of (finite) level n.
We define (by downward induction):
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(1) Valid X − to− Y arrow:
Let X,Y ⊆ P (X ).
α ∈ A(X ) is a valid X − to− Y arrow iff
(1.1) O(α) ⊆ X, D(α) ⊆ Y,
(1.2) ∀β : x′ → α.(x′ ∈ X ⇒ ∃γ : x′′ → β.(γ is a valid X − to− Y arrow)).
We will also say that α is a valid arrow in X, or just valid in X, iff α is a valid X − to−X arrow.
(2) Valid X ⇒ Y arrow:
Let X ⊆ Y ⊆ P (X ).
α ∈ A(X ) is a valid X ⇒ Y arrow iff
(2.1) o(α) ∈ X, O(α) ⊆ Y, D(α) ⊆ Y,
(2.2) ∀β : x′ → α.(x′ ∈ Y ⇒ ∃γ : x′′ → β.(γ is a valid X ⇒ Y arrow)).
(Note that in particular o(γ) ∈ X, and that o(β) need not be in X, but can be in the bigger Y.)
Fact 3.4
(1) If α is a valid X ⇒ Y arrow, then α is a valid Y − to− Y arrow.
(2) If X ⊆ X ′ ⊆ Y ′ ⊆ Y ⊆ P (X ) and α ∈ A(X ) is a valid X ⇒ Y arrow, and O(α) ⊆ Y ′, D(α) ⊆ Y ′,
then α is a valid X ′ ⇒ Y ′ arrow.
Proof Fact Higher-Validity
Let α be a valid X ⇒ Y arrow. We show (1) and (2) together by downward induction (both are trivial).
By prerequisite o(α) ∈ X ⊆ X ′, O(α) ⊆ Y ′ ⊆ Y, D(α) ⊆ Y ′ ⊆ Y.
Case 1: λ(α) = n. So α is a valid X ′ ⇒ Y ′ arrow, and a valid Y − to− Y arrow.
Case 2: λ(α) = n− 1. So there is no β : x′ → α, y ∈ Y, so α is a valid Y − to− Y arrow. By Y ′ ⊆ Y α is
a valid X ′ ⇒ Y ′ arrow.
Case 3: Let the result be shown down to m, n > m > 1, let λ(α) = m − 1. So ∀β : x′ → α(x′ ∈ Y ⇒
∃γ : x′′ → β(x′′ ∈ X and γ is a valid X ⇒ Y arrow)). By induction hypothesis γ is a valid Y − to − Y
arrow, and a valid X ′ ⇒ Y ′ arrow. So α is a valid Y − to−Y arrow, and by Y ′ ⊆ Y, α is a valid X ′ ⇒ Y ′
arrow.

Definition 3.11
Let X be a generalized preferential structure of level n, X ⊆ P (X ).
µ(X) := {x ∈ X : ∃ < x, i > .¬∃ valid X − to−X arrow α : x′ →< x, i >}.
Comment 3.2
The purpose of smoothness is to guarantee cumulativity. Smoothness achieves Cumulativity by mirroring
all information present in X also in µ(X). Closer inspection shows that smoothness does more than
necessary. This is visible when there are copies (or, equivalently, non-injective labelling functions).
Suppose we have two copies of x ∈ X, < x, i > and < x, i′ >, and there is y ∈ X, α :< y, j >→< x, i >,
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but there is no α′ :< y′, j′ >→< x, i′ >, y′ ∈ X. Then α :< y, j >→< x, i > is irrelevant, as x ∈ µ(X)
anyhow. So mirroring α :< y, j >→< x, i > in µ(X) is not necessary, i.e. it is not necessary to have
some α′ :< y′, j′ >→< x, i >, y′ ∈ µ(X).
On the other hand, Example 3.3 shows that, if we want smooth structures to correspond to the property
(µCUM), we need at least some valid arrows from µ(X) also for higher level arrows. This “some” is
made precise (essentially) in Definition 3.12.
From a more philosophical point of view, when we see the (inverted) arrows of preferential structures as
attacks on non-minimal elements, then we should see smooth structures as always having attacks also
from valid (minimal) elements. So, in general structures, also attacks from non-valid elements are valid,
in smooth structures we always also have attacks from valid elements.
The analogon to usual smooth structures, on level 2, is then that any successfully attacked level 1 arrow
is also attacked from a minimal point.
Definition 3.12
Let X be a generalized preferential structure.
X ⊑ X ′ iff
(1) X ⊆ X ′ ⊆ P (X ),
(2) ∀x ∈ X ′ −X ∀ < x, i > ∃α : x′ →< x, i > (α is a valid X ⇒ X ′ arrow),
(3) ∀x ∈ X ∃ < x, i >
(∀α : x′ →< x, i > (x′ ∈ X ′ ⇒ ∃β : x′′ → α.(β is a valid X ⇒ X ′ arrow))).
Note that (3) is not simply the negation of (2):
Consider a level 1 structure. Thus all level 1 arrows are valid, but the source of the arrows must not be
neglected.
(2) reads now: ∀x ∈ X ′ −X ∀ < x, i > ∃α : x′ →< x, i > .x′ ∈ X
(3) reads: ∀x ∈ X ∃ < x, i > ¬∃α : x′ →< x, i > .x′ ∈ X ′
This is intended: intuitively, X = µ(X ′), and minimal elements must not be attacked at all, but non-
minimals must be attacked from X - which is a modified version of smoothness.
Remark 3.5
We note the special case of Definition 3.12 for level 3 structures, as it will be used later. We also write
it immediately for the intended case µ(X) ⊑ X, and explicitly with copies.
x ∈ µ(X) iff
(1) ∃ < x, i > ∀ < α, k >:< y, j >→< x, i >
(y ∈ X → ∃ < β′, l′ >:< z′,m′ >→< α, k > .
(z′ ∈ µ(X) ∧ ¬∃ < γ′, n′ >:< u′, p′ >→< β′, l′ > .u′ ∈ X))
See Diagram 3.1.
x ∈ X − µ(X) iff
(2) ∀ < x, i > ∃ < α′, k′ >:< y′, j′ >→< x, i >
(y′ ∈ µ(X) ∧
(a) ¬∃ < β′, l′ >:< z′,m′ >→< α′, k′ > .z′ ∈ X
or
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(b) ∀ < β′, l′ >:< z′,m′ >→< α′, k′ >
(z′ ∈ X → ∃ < γ′, n′ >:< u′, p′ >→< β′, l′ > .u′ ∈ µ(X)) )
See Diagram 3.2.
Diagram 3.1
X
µ(X)
< x, i >
< y, j >
< α, k >
< z′,m′ >
< β′, l′ >
< γ′, n′ >
< u′, p′ >
Case 3-1-2
26
Diagram 3.2
X
µ(X)
< y′, j′ >
< x, i >
< α′, k′ >
< z′,m′ >
< β′, l′ >
< γ′, n′ >
< u′, p′ >
Case 3-2
Fact 3.6
(1) If X ⊑ X ′, then X = µ(X ′),
(2) X ⊑ X ′, X ⊆ X ′′ ⊆ X ′ ⇒ X ⊑ X ′′. (This corresponds to (µCUM).)
(3) X ⊑ X ′, X ⊆ Y ′, Y ⊑ Y ′, Y ⊆ X ′ ⇒ X = Y. (This corresponds to (µ ⊆⊇).)
Proof Fact X − Sub−X ′
Proof
(1) Trivial by Fact 3.4 (1).
(2)
We have to show
(a) ∀x ∈ X ′′ −X ∀ < x, i > ∃α : x′ →< x, i > (α is a valid X ⇒ X ′′ arrow), and
(b) ∀x ∈ X ∃ < x, i > (∀α : x′ →< x, i > (x′ ∈ X ′′ ⇒ ∃β : x′′ → α.(β is a valid X ⇒ X ′′ arrow))).
Both follow from the corresponding condition for X ⇒ X ′, the restriction of the universal quantifier, and
Fact 3.4 (2).
(3)
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Let x ∈ X−Y.
(a) By x ∈ X ⊑ X ′, ∃ < x, i > s.t. (∀α : x′ →< x, i > (x′ ∈ X ′ ⇒ ∃β : x′′ → α.(β is a valid X ⇒ X ′
arrow))).
(b) By x 6∈ Y ⊑ ∃α1 : x′ →< x, i > α1 is a valid Y ⇒ Y ′ arrow, in particular x′ ∈ Y ⊆ X ′. Moreover,
λ(α1) = 1.
So by (a) ∃β2 : x′′ → α.(β2 is a valid X ⇒ X ′ arrow), in particular x′′ ∈ X ⊆ Y ′, moreover λ(β2) = 2.
It follows by induction from the definition of valid A⇒ B arrows that
∀n∃α2m+1, λ(α2m+1) = 2m+ 1, α2m+1 a valid Y ⇒ Y ′ arrow and
∀n∃β2m+2, λ(β2m+2) = 2m+ 2, β2m+2 a valid X ⇒ X ′ arrow,
which is impossible, as X is a structure of finite level.

Definition 3.13
Let X be a generalized preferential structure, X ⊆ P (X ).
X is called totally smooth for X iff
(1) ∀α : x→ y ∈ A(X )(O(α) ∪D(α) ⊆ X ⇒ ∃α′ : x′ → y.x′ ∈ µ(X))
(2) if α is valid, then α′ must also be valid.
(y a point or an arrow).
If Y ⊆ P (X ), then X is called Y−totally smooth iff for all X ∈ Y X is totally smooth for X.
Example 3.2
X := {α : a→ b, α′ : b→ c, α′′ : a→ c, β : b→ α′} is not totally smooth,
X := {α : a→ b, α′ : b→ c, α′′ : a→ c, β : b→ α′, β′ : a→ α′} is totally smooth.
Example 3.3
Consider α′ : a→ b, α′′ : b→ c, α : a→ c, β : a→ α.
Then µ({a, b, c}) = {a}, µ({a, c}) = {a, c}. Thus, (µCUM) does not hold in this structure. Note that
there is no valid arrow from µ({a, b, c}) to c.
Definition 3.14
Let X be a generalized preferential structure, X ⊆ P (X ).
X is called essentially smooth for X iff µ(X) ⊑ X.
If Y ⊆ P (X ), then X is called Y−essentially smooth iff for all X ∈ Y µ(X) ⊑ X.
Example 3.4
It is easy to see that we can distinguish total and essential smoothness in richer structures, as the following
Example shows:
We add an accessibility relation R, and consider only those models which are accessible.
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Let e.g. a → b →< c, 0 >, < c, 1 >, without transitivity. Thus, only c has two copies. This structure is
essentially smooth, but of course not totally so.
Let now mRa, mRb, mR < c, 0 >, mR < c, 1 >, m′Ra, m′Rb, m′R < c, 0 > .
Thus, seen from m, µ({a, b, c}) = {a, c}, but seen from m′, µ({a, b, c}) = {a}, but µ({a, c}) = {a, c},
contradicting (CUM).

3.2.2 Results on not necessarily smooth structures
Example 3.5
We show here (µ ⊆) + (µ ⊆⊇) + (µCUM) + (µRatM) + (∩) 6⇒ (µPR).
Let U := {a, b, c}. Let Y = P(U). So (∩) is trivially satisfied. Set f(X) := X for all X ⊆ U except for
f({a, b}) = {b}. Obviously, this cannot be represented by a preferential structure and (µPR) is false for
U and {a, b}. But it satisfies (µ ⊆), (µCUM), (µRatM). (µ ⊆) is trivial. (µCUM) : Let f(X) ⊆ Y ⊆ X.
If f(X) = X, we are done. Consider f({a, b}) = {b}. If {b} ⊆ Y ⊆ {a, b}, then f(Y ) = {b}, so we are
done again. It is shown in Fact 3.2, (8) that (µ ⊆⊇) follows. (µRatM) : Suppose X ⊆ Y, X ∩ f(Y ) 6= ∅,
we have to show f(X) ⊆ f(Y ) ∩ X. If f(Y ) = Y, the result holds by X ⊆ Y, so it does if X = Y. The
only remaining case is Y = {a, b}, X = {b}, and the result holds again.

The idea to solve the representation problem illustrated by Example 3.5 is to use the points c and d as
bases for counterarguments against α : b→ a - as is possible in IBRS. We do this now. We will obtain a
representation for logics weaker than P by generalized preferential structures.
Definition 3.15
NOETIG???
(1) Let X be a diagram and Y ⊆ X. Y is called a legal subdiagram of X iff it can be obtained from X
and the set of points of Y inductively as follows:
(1.1) all points of Y are in Y
(1.2) if a, b (b a point or arrow) are in Y, then so is any arrow from a to b, which is in X.
(These are all the objects in Y ).
(2) If we work with copies of points, then we define: Y is called a legal subdiagram of X iff it can be
obtained from X and the set of points of Y inductively as follows:
(2.1) if there is some < y, i > in Y ⊆ X, then all < y, i′ >∈ X are in Y too,
(2.2) if a, b (b a point or arrow) are in Y, then so is any arrow from a to b, which is in X.
(These are all the objects in Y ).
29
From now on, all subdiagrams will be legal.
We will now prove a representation theorem, but will make it more general than for preferential structures
only. For this purpose, we will introduce some definitions first.
Definition 3.16
Let η, ρ : Y → P(U).
(1) If X is a simple structure:
X is called an attacking structure relative to η representing ρ iff
ρ(X) = {x ∈ η(X) : there is no valid X − to− η(X) arrow α : x′ → x}
for all X ∈ Y.
(2) If X is a structure with copies:
X is called an attacking structure relative to η representing ρ iff
ρ(X) = {x ∈ η(X) : there is < x, i > and no valid X − to− η(X) arrow α :< x′, i′ >→< x, i >}
for all X ∈ Y.
Obviously, in those cases ρ(X) ⊆ η(X) for all X ∈ Y.
Thus, X is a preferential structure iff η is the identity.
See Diagram 3.3
Diagram 3.3
X
η(X)
ρ(X)
Attacking structure
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(Note that it does not seem very useful to generalize the notion of smoothness from preferential structures
to general attacking structures, as, in the general case, the minimizing set X and the result ρ(X) may
be disjoint.)
The following result is the first positive representation result of this paper, and shows that we can obtain
(almost) anything with level 2 structures.
Proposition 3.7
Let η, ρ : Y → P(U). Then there is an attacking level 2 structure relative to η representing ρ iff
(1) ρ(X) ⊆ η(X) for all X ∈ Y,
(2) ρ(∅) = η(∅) if ∅ ∈ Y.
(2) is, of course, void for preferential structures.
Proof:
(A) The construction
We make a two stage construction.
(A.1) Stage 1.
In stage one, consider (almost as usual)
U :=< X , {αi : i ∈ I} > where
X := {< x, f >: x ∈ U, f ∈ Π{X ∈ Y : x ∈ η(X)− ρ(X)}},
α : x′ →< x, f > :⇔ x′ ∈ ran(f). Attention: x′ ∈ X, not x′ ∈ ρ(X)!
(A.2) Stage 2.
Let X ′ be the set of all < x, f,X > s.t. < x, f >∈ X and
(a) either X is some dummy value, say ∗
or
(b) all of the following (1)− (4) hold:
(1) X ∈ Y,
(2) x ∈ ρ(X),
(3) there is X ′ ⊆ X, x ∈ η(X ′)− ρ(X ′), X ′ ∈ Y, (thus ran(f) ∩X 6= ∅ by definition),
(4) ∀X ′′ ∈ Y.(X ⊆ X ′′, x ∈ η(X ′′)− ρ(X ′′) → (ran(f) ∩X ′′)−X 6= ∅).
(Thus, f chooses in (4) for X ′′ also outside X. If there is no such X ′′, (4) is void, and only (1)− (3) need
to hold, i.e. we may take any f with < x, f >∈ X .)
See Diagram 3.4.
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Diagram 3.4
f(X′′)
ρ(X)
X′′
X
ρ(X′′)
ρ(X′)
X′
x
For simplicity, η(X) = X here
The complicated case
Note: If (1)− (3) are satisfied for x and X, then we will find f s.t. < x, f >∈ X , and < x, f,X > satisfies
(1)− (4) : As X
⊂
6= X ′′ for X ′′ as in (4), we find f which chooses for such X ′′ outside of X.
So for any < x, f >∈ X , there is < x, f, ∗ >, and maybe also some < x, f,X > in X ′.
Let again for any x′, < x, f,X >∈ X ′
α : x′ →< x, f,X > :⇔ x′ ∈ ran(f)
(A.3) Adding arrows.
Consider x′ and < x, f,X > .
If X = ∗, or x′ 6∈ X, we do nothing, i.e. leave a simple arrow α : x′ →< x, f,X > ⇔ x′ ∈ ran(f).
If X ∈ Y, and x′ ∈ X, and x′ ∈ ran(f), we make X many copies of the attacking arrow and have then:
< α, x′′ >: x′ →< x, f,X > for all x′′ ∈ X.
In addition, we add attacks on the < α, x′′ >: < β, x′′ >: x′′ →< α, x′′ > for all x′′ ∈ X.
The full structure Z is thus:
X ′ is the set of elements.
If x′ ∈ ran(f), and X = ∗ or x′ 6∈ X then α : x′ →< x, f,X >
if x′ ∈ ran(f), and X 6= ∗ and x′ ∈ X then
(a) < α, x′′ >: x′ →< x, f,X > for all x′′ ∈ X,
(b) < β, x′′ >: x′′ →< α, x′′ > for all x′′ ∈ X.
See Diagram 3.5.
Diagram 3.5
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< x, f,X >x′
< a, x′′
0
>
< a, x′′
1
>
x′′
0
x′′
1
< β, x′′
1
>
< β, x′′
o
>
X
η(X)
ρ(X)
Attacking structure
(B) Representation
We have to show that this structure represents ρ relative to η.
Let y ∈ η(Y ), Y ∈ Y.
Case 1. y ∈ ρ(Y ).
We have to show that there is < y, g, Y ′′ > s.t. there is no valid α : y′ →< y, g, Y ′′ >, y′ ∈ Y. In Case
1.1 below, Y ′′ will be ∗, in Case 1.2, Y ′′ will be Y, g will be chosen suitably.
Case 1.1. There is no Y ′ ⊆ Y, y ∈ η(Y ′)− ρ(Y ′), Y ′ ∈ Y.
So for all Y ′ with y ∈ η(Y ′) − ρ(Y ′) Y ′ − Y 6= ∅. Let g ∈ Π{Y ′ − Y : y ∈ η(Y ′) − ρ(Y ′)}. Then
ran(g) ∩ Y = ∅, and < y, g, ∗ > is not attacked from Y. (< y, g > was already not attacked in X .)
Case 1.2. There is Y ′ ⊆ Y, y ∈ η(Y ′)− ρ(Y ′), Y ′ ∈ Y.
Let now < y, g, Y >∈ X ′, s.t. g(Y ′′) 6∈ Y if Y ⊆ Y ′′, y ∈ η(Y ′′) − ρ(Y ′′), Y ′′ ∈ Y. As noted above, such
g and thus < y, g, Y > exist. Fix < y, g, Y > .
Consider any y′ ∈ ran(g). If y′ 6∈ Y, y′ does not attack < y, g, Y > in Y. Suppose y′ ∈ Y. We had made
Y many copies < α, y′′ >, y′′ ∈ Y with < α, y′′ >: y′ →< y, g, Y > and had added the level 2 arrows
< β, y′′ >: y′′ →< α, y′′ > for y′′ ∈ Y. So all copies < α, y′′ > are destroyed in Y. This was done for all
y′ ∈ Y, y′ ∈ ran(g), so < y, g, Y > is now not (validly) attacked in Y any more.
Case 2. y ∈ η(Y )− ρ(Y ).
Let < y, g, Y ′ > (where Y ′ can be ∗) be any copy of y, we have to show that there is z ∈ Y, α : z →<
y, g, Y ′ >, or some < α, z′ >: z →< y, g, Y ′ >, z′ ∈ Y ′, which is not destroyed by some level 2 arrow
< β, z′ >: z′ →< α, z′ >, z′ ∈ Y.
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As y ∈ η(Y )− ρ(Y ), ran(g) ∩ Y 6= ∅, so there is z ∈ ran(g) ∩ Y. Fix such z. (We will modify the choice
of z only in Case 2.2.2 below.)
Case 2.1. Y ′ = ∗.
As z ∈ ran(g), α : z →< y, g, ∗ > . (There were no level 2 arrows introduced for this copy.)
Case 2.2. Y ′ 6= ∗.
So < y, g, Y ′ > satisfies the conditions (1)− (4) of (b) at the beginning of the proof.
If z 6∈ Y ′, we are done, as α : z →< y, g, Y ′ >, and there were no level 2 arrows introduced in this case.
If z ∈ Y ′, we had made Y ′ many copies < α, z′ >, < α, z′ >: z →< y, g, Y ′ >, one for each z′ ∈ Y ′. Each
< α, z′ > was destroyed by < β, z′ >: z′ →< α, z′ >, z′ ∈ Y ′.
Case 2.2.1. Y ′ 6⊆ Y.
Let z′′ ∈ Y ′−Y, then < α, z′′ >: z →< y, g, Y ′ > is destroyed only by < β, z′′ >: z′′ →< α, z′′ > in Y ′,
but not in Y, as z′′ 6∈ Y, so < y, g, Y ′ > is attacked by < α, z′′ >: z →< y, g, Y ′ >, valid in Y.
Case 2.2.2. Y ′
⊂
6= Y (Y = Y ′ is impossible, as y ∈ ρ(Y ′), y 6∈ ρ(Y )).
Then there was by definition (condition (b) (4)) some z′ ∈ (ran(g) ∩ Y )− Y ′ and α : z′ →< y, g, Y ′ > is
valid, as z′ 6∈ Y ′. (In this case, there are no copies of α and no level 2 arrows.)

Corollary 3.8
(1) We cannot distinguish general structures of level 2 from those of higher levels by their ρ−functions
relative to η.
(2) Let U be the universe, Y ⊆ P(U), µ : Y → P(U). Then any µ satisfying (µ ⊆) can be represented by
a level 2 preferential structure. (Choose η = identity.)
Again, we cannot distinguish general structures of level 2 from those of higher levels by their µ−functions.

A remark on the function η :
We can also obtain the function η via arrows. Of course, then we need positive arrows (not only negative
arrows against negative arrows, as we first need to have something positive).
If η is the identity, we can make a positive arrow from each point to itself. Otherwise, we can connect
every point to every point by a positive arrow, and then choose those we really want in η by a choice
function obtained from arrows just as we obtained ρ from arrows.
3.2.3 Results on total smoothness
Fact 3.9
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Let X,Y ∈ Y, X a level n structure. Let < α, k >:< x, i >→< y, j >, where < y, j > may itself be (a
copy of) an arrow.
(1) Let n > 1, X ⊆ Y, < α, k >∈ X a level n − 1 arrow in X⌈X. If < α, k > is valid in X⌈Y, then it is
valid in X⌈X.
(2) Let X be totally smooth, µ(X) ⊆ Y, µ(Y ) ⊆ X, < α, k >∈ X⌈X ∩ Y, then < α, k > is valid in X⌈X
iff it is valid in X⌈Y.
Note that we will also sometimes write X for X⌈X, when the context is clear.
Proof:
(1) If < α, k > is not valid in X⌈X, then there must be a level n arrow < β, r >:< z, s >→< α, k > in
X⌈X ⊆ X⌈Y. < β, r > must be valid in X⌈X and X⌈Y, as there are no level n + 1 arrows. So < α, k >
is not valid in X⌈Y, contradiction.
(2) By downward induction. Case n : < α, k >∈ X⌈X ∩Y, so it is valid in both as there are no level n+1
arrows. Case m→ m− 1 : Let < α, k >∈ X⌈X ∩Y be a level m− 1 arrow valid in X⌈X, but not in X⌈Y.
So there must be a level m arrow < β, r >:< z, s >→< α, k > valid in X⌈Y. By total smoothness, we
may assume z ∈ µ(Y ) ⊆ X, so < β, r >∈ X⌈X valid by induction hypothesis. So < α, k > is not valid in
X⌈X, contradiction.

Corollary 3.10
Let X,Y ∈ Y, X a totally smooth level n structure, µ(X) ⊆ Y, µ(Y ) ⊆ X. Then µ(X) = µ(Y ).
Proof:
Let x ∈ µ(X) − µ(Y ). Then by µ(X) ⊆ Y, x ∈ Y, so there must be for all < x, i >∈ X an arrow
< α, k >:< y, j >→< x, i > valid in X⌈Y, wlog. y ∈ µ(Y ) ⊆ X by total smoothness. So by Fact 3.9, (2),
< α, k > is valid in X⌈X. This holds for all < x, i >, so x 6∈ µ(X), contradiction. 
Fact 3.11
There are situations satisfying (µ ⊆) + (µCUM) + (∩) which cannot be represented by level 2 totally
smooth preferential structures.
The proof is given in the following example.
Example 3.6
Let Y := {x, y, y′}, X := {x, y}, X ′ := {x, y′}. Let Y := P(Y ). Let µ(Y ) := {y, y′}, µ(X) := µ(X ′) :=
{x}, and µ(Z) := Z for all other sets.
Obviously, this satisfies (∩), (µ ⊆), and (µCUM).
Suppose X is a totally smooth level 2 structure representing µ.
So µ(X) = µ(X ′) ⊆ Y − µ(Y ), µ(Y ) ⊆ X ∪X ′. Let < x, i > be minimal in X⌈X. As < x, i > cannot be
minimal in X⌈Y, there must be α :< z, j >→< x, i >, valid in X⌈Y.
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Case 1: z ∈ X ′.
So α ∈ X⌈X ′. If α is valid in X⌈X ′, there must be α′ :< x′, i′ >→< x, i >, x′ ∈ µ(X ′), valid in X⌈X ′, and
thus in X⌈X, by µ(X) = µ(X ′) and Fact 3.9 (2). This is impossible, so there must be β :< x′, i′ >→ α,
x′ ∈ µ(X ′), valid in X⌈X ′. As β is in X⌈Y and X a level ≤ 2 structure, β is valid in X⌈Y, so α is not
valid in X⌈Y, contradiction.
Case 2: z ∈ X.
α cannot be valid in X⌈X, so there must be β :< x′, i′ >→ α, x′ ∈ µ(X), valid in X⌈X. Again, as β is in
X⌈Y and X a level ≤ 2 structure, β is valid in X⌈Y, so α is not valid in X⌈Y, contradiction.

It is unknown to the authors whether an analogon is true for essential smoothness, i.e. whether there are
examples of such µ function which need at least level 3 essentially smooth structures for representation.
Proposition 3.15 below shows that such structures suffice, but we do not know whether level 3 is necessary.
Fact 3.12
Above Example 3.6 can be solved by a totally smooth level 3 structure:
Let α1 : x→ y, α2 : x→ y′, α3 : y → x, β1 : y → α2, β2 : y′ → α1, β3 : y → α3, β4 : x→ α3, γ1 : y′ → β3,
γ2 : y
′ → β4.
See Diagram 3.6.
Diagram 3.6
γ1
y
y′
β1
β2
α1
x
β3
γ2
β4
α3
α2
Solution by smooth level 3 structure
The legal subdiagram generated by X contains α1, α3, β3, β4. α1, β3, β4 are valid, so µ(X) = {x}.
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The legal subdiagram generated by X ′ contains α2. α2 is valid, so µ(X
′) = {x}.
In the full diagram, α3, β1, β2, γ1, γ2 are valid, so µ(Y ) = {y, y′}.

Remark 3.13
Example 3.7 together with Corollary 3.10 show that (µ ⊆) and (µCUM) without (∩) do not guarantee
representability by a level n totally smooth structure.
Example 3.7
We show here (µ ⊆) + (µCUM) 6⇒ (µ ⊆⊇).
Consider X := {a, b, c}, Y := {a, b, d}, f(X) := {a}, f(Y ) := {a, b}, Y := {X,Y }. (If f({a, b}) were
defined, we would have f(X) = f({a, b}) = f(Y ), contradiction.)
Obviously, (µ ⊆) and (µCUM) hold, but not (µ ⊆⊇).

3.2.4 Results on essential smoothness
Definition 3.17
Let µ : Y → P(U) and X be given, let α :< y, j >→< x, i >∈ X .
Define
O(α) := {Y ∈ Y : x ∈ Y − µ(Y ), y ∈ µ(Y )},
D(α) := {X ∈ Y : x ∈ µ(X), y ∈ X},
Π(O, α) := Π{µ(Y ) : Y ∈ O(α)},
Π(D, α) := Π{µ(X) : X ∈ D(α)}.
Lemma 3.14
Let U be the universe, µ : Y → P(U). Let µ satisfy (µ ⊆) + (µ ⊆⊇).
Let X be a level 1 preferential structure, α :< y, j >→< x, i >, O(α) 6= ∅, D(α) 6= ∅.
We can modify X to a level 3 structure X ′ by introducing level 2 and level 3 arrows s.t. no copy of α is
valid in any X ∈ D(α), and in every Y ∈ O(α) at least one copy of α is valid. (More precisely, we should
write X ′⌈X etc.)
Thus, in X ′,
(1) < x, i > will not be minimal in any Y ∈ O(α),
(2) if α is the only arrow minimizing < x, i > in X ∈ D(α), < x, i > will now be minimal in X.
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The construction is made independently for all such arrows α ∈ X .
(This is probably the main technical result of the paper.)
Proof:
(1) The construction
Make Π(D, α) many copies of α : {< α, f >: f ∈ Π(D, α)}, all < α, f >:< y, j >→< x, i > . Note that
< α, f >∈ X for all X ∈ D(α) and < α, f >∈ Y for all Y ∈ O(α).
Add to the structure < β, f,Xr, g >:< f(Xr), ir >→< α, f >, for any Xr ∈ D(α), and g ∈ Π(O, α) (and
some or all ir - this does not matter).
For all Ys ∈ O(α) :
if µ(Ys) 6⊆ Xr and f(Xr) ∈ Ys, then add to the structure < γ, f,Xr, g, Ys >:< g(Ys), js >→< β, f,Xr, g >
(again for all or some js),
if µ(Ys) ⊆ Xr or f(Xr) 6∈ Ys, < γ, f,Xr, g, Ys > is not added.
See Diagram 3.7.
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Diagram 3.7
X ∈ D(α)
Y ∈ O(α)
µ(X)
µ(Y )
< x, i > < y, j >< α, f >
< f(Xr), ir >
< β, f,Xr , g >
< g(Ys), js >
< γ, f, Xr , g, Ys >
The construction
(2)
Let Xr ∈ D(α). We have to show that no < α, f > is valid in Xr. Fix f.
< α, f > is in Xr, so we have to show that for at least one g ∈ Π(O, α) < β, f,Xr, g > is valid in Xr, i.e.
that for this g, no < γ, f,Xr, g, Ys >:< g(Ys), js >→< β, f,Xr, g >, Ys ∈ O(α) attacks < β, f,Xr, g >
in Xr.
We define g. Take Ys ∈ O(α).
Case 1: µ(Ys) ⊆ Xr or f(Xr) 6∈ Ys : choose arbitrary g(Ys) ∈ µ(Ys).
Case 2: µ(Ys) 6⊆ Xr and f(Xr) ∈ Ys : Choose g(Ys) ∈ µ(Ys)−Xr.
In Case 1, < γ, f,Xr, g, Ys > does not exist, so it cannot attack < β, f,Xr, g > .
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In Case 2, < γ, f,Xr, g, Ys >:< g(Ys), js >→< β, f,Xr, g > is not in Xr, as g(Ys) 6∈ Xr.
Thus, no < γ, f,Xr, g, Ys >:< g(Ys), js >→< β, f,Xr, g >, Ys ∈ O(α) attacks < β, f,Xr, g > in Xr.
So ∀ < α, f >:< y, j >→< x, i >
y ∈ Xr → ∃ < β, f,Xr, g >:< f(Xr), ir >→< α, f >
(f(Xr) ∈ µ(Xr) ∧ ¬∃ < γ, f,Xr, g, Ys >:< g(Ys), js >→< β, f,Xr, g > .g(Ys) ∈ Xr).
But < β, f,Xr, g > was constructed only for < α, f >, so was < γ, f,Xr, g, Ys >, and there was no other
< γ, i > attacking < β, f,Xr, g >, so we are done.
(3)
Let Ys ∈ O(α). We have to show that at least one < α, f > is valid in Ys.
We define f ∈ Π(D, α). Take Xr.
If µ(Xr) 6⊆ Ys, choose f(Xr) ∈ µ(Xr)− Ys. If µ(Xr) ⊆ Ys, choose arbitrary f(Xr) ∈ µ(Xr).
All attacks on < x, f > have the form < β, f,Xr, g >:< f(Xr), ir >→< α, f >, Xr ∈ D(α), g ∈ Π(O, α).
We have to show that they are either not in Ys, or that they are themselves attacked in Ys.
Case 1: µ(Xr) 6⊆ Ys. Then f(Xr) 6∈ Ys, so < β, f,Xr, g >:< f(Xr), ir >→< α, f > is not in Ys (for no
g).
Case 2: µ(Xr) ⊆ Ys. Then µ(Ys) 6⊆ Xr by (µ ⊆⊇) and f(Xr) ∈ Ys, so < β, f,Xr, g >:< f(Xr), ir >→<
α, f > is in Ys (for all g). Take any g ∈ Π(O, α). As µ(Ys) 6⊆ Xr and f(Xr) ∈ Ys, < γ, f,Xr, g, Ys >:<
g(Ys), js >→< β, f,Xr, g > is defined, and g(Ys) ∈ µ(Ys), so it is in Ys (for all g). Thus, < β, f,Xr, g >
is attacked in Ys.
Thus, for this f, all < β, f,Xr, g > are either not in Ys, or attacked in Ys, thus for this f, < α, f > is
valid in Ys.
So for this < x, i >
∃ < α, f >:< y, j >→< x, i > .y ∈ µ(Ys) ∧
(a) ¬∃ < β, f,Xr, g >:< f(Xr), i >→< α, f > .f(Xr) ∈ Ys
or
(b) ∀ < β, f,Xr, g >:< f(Xr), i >→< α, f >
(f(Xr) ∈ Ys →
∃ < γ, f,Xr, g, Ys >:< g(Ys), js >→< β, f,Xr, g > .g(Ys) ∈ µ(Ys)).
As we made copies of α only, introduced only β′s attacking the α−copies, and γ′s attacking the β′s, the
construction is independent for different α′s.

Proposition 3.15
Let U be the universe, µ : Y → P(U).
Then any µ satisfying (µ ⊆), (∩), (µCUM) (or, alternatively, (µ ⊆) and (µ ⊆⊇)) can be represented by
a level 3 essentially smooth structure.
Proof:
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In stage one, consider as usual U :=< X , {αi : i ∈ I} > where X := {< x, f >: x ∈ U, f ∈ Π{µ(X) :
X ∈ Y, x ∈ X − µ(X)}}, and set α :< x′, f ′ >→< x, f > :⇔ x′ ∈ ran(f).
For stage two:
Any level 1 arrow α :< y, j >→< x, i > was introduced in stage one by some Y ∈ Y s.t. y ∈ µ(Y ),
x ∈ Y − µ(Y ). Do the construction of Lemma 3.14 for all level 1 arrows of X in parallel or successively.
We have to show that the resulting structure represents µ and is essentially smooth. (Level 3 is obvious.)
(1) Representation
Suppose x ∈ Y − µ(Y ). Then there was in stage 1 for all < x, i > some α :< y, j >→< x, i >, y ∈ µ(Y ).
We examine the y.
If there is no X s.t. x ∈ µ(X), y ∈ X, then there were no β′s and γ′s introduced for this α :< y, j >→<
x, i >, so α is valid.
If there is X s.t. x ∈ µ(X), y ∈ X, consider α :< y, j >→< x, i > . So X ∈ D(α), Y ∈ O(α), so we did
the construction of Lemma 3.14, and by its result, < x, i > is not minimal in Y.
Thus, in both cases, < x, i > is successfully attacked in Y, and no < x, i > is a minimal element in Y.
Suppose x ∈ µ(X) (we change notation to conform to Lemma 3.14). Fix < x, i > .
If there is no α :< y, j >→< x, i >, y ∈ X, then < x, i > is minimal in X, and we are done.
If there is α or < α, k >:< y, j >→< x, i >, y ∈ X, then α originated from stage one through some Y
s.t. x ∈ Y − µ(Y ), and y ∈ µ(Y ). (Note that stage 2 of the construction did not introduce any new level
1 arrows - only copies of existing level 1 arrows.) So X ∈ D(α), Y ∈ O(α), so we did the construction of
Lemma 3.14, and by its result, < x, i > is minimal in X, and we are done again.
In both cases, all < x, i > are minimal elements in X.
(2) Essential smoothness. We have to show the conditions of Definition 3.12. We will, however, work
with the reformulation given in Remark 3.5.
Case (1), x ∈ µ(X).
Case (1.1), there is < x, i > with no < α, f >:< y, j >→< x, i >, y ∈ X. There is nothing to show.
Case (1.2), for all < x, i > there is < α, f >:< y, j >→< x, i >, y ∈ X.
α was introduced in stage 1 by some Y s.t. x ∈ Y − µ(Y ), y ∈ X ∩ µ(Y ), so X ∈ D(α), Y ∈ O(α). In
the proof of Lemma 3.14, at the end of (2), it was shown that
∃ < β, f,Xr, g >:< f(Xr), ir >→< α, f >
(f(Xr) ∈ µ(Xr) ∧
¬∃ < γ, f,Xr, g, Ys >:< g(Ys), js >→< β, f,Xr, g > .g(Ys) ∈ Xr).
By f(Xr) ∈ µ(Xr), condition (1) of Remark 3.5 is true.
Case (2), x 6∈ µ(Y ). Fix < x, i > . (We change notation back to Y.)
In stage 1, we constructed α :< y, j >→< x, i >, y ∈ µ(Y ), so Y ∈ O(α).
If D(α) = ∅, then there is no attack on α, and the condition (2) of Remark 3.5 is trivially true.
If D(α) 6= ∅, we did the construction of Lemma 3.14, so
∃ < α, f >:< y, j >→< x, i > .y ∈ µ(Ys) ∧
(a) ¬∃ < β, f,Xr, g >:< f(Xr), i >→< α, f > .f(Xr) ∈ Ys
or
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(b) ∀ < β, f,Xr, g >:< f(Xr), i >→< α, f >
(f(Xr) ∈ Ys →
∃ < γ, f,Xr, g, Ys >:< g(Ys), js >→< β, f,Xr, g > .g(Ys) ∈ µ(Ys).
As the only attacks on < α, f > had the form < β, f,Xr, g >, and g(Ys) ∈ µ(Ys), condition (2) of Remark
3.5 is satisfied.

As said after Example 3.6, we do not know if level 3 is necessary for representation. We also do not know
whether the same can be achieved with level 3, or higher, totally smooth structures.
3.2.5 Translation to logics
We turn to the translation to logics.
Proposition 3.16
Let ∼| be a logic for L. Set TM := Th(µM(M(T ))), whereM is a generalized preferential structure, and
µM its choice function. Then
(1) there is a level 2 preferential structureM s.t. T = TM iff (LLE), (CCL), (SC) hold for all T, T ′ ⊆ L.
(2) there is a level 3 essentially smooth preferential structure M s.t. T = TM iff (LLE), (CCL), (SC),
(⊆⊇) hold for all T, T ′ ⊆ L.
The proof is an immediate consequence of Corollary 3.8 (2), Fact 3.6, Proposition 3.15, and Proposition
3.3 (10) and (11).
We leave aside the generalization of preferential structures to attacking structures relative to η, as this
can cause problems, without giving real insight: It might well be that ρ(X) 6⊆ η(X), but, still, ρ(X) and
η(X) might define the same theory - see Section 3.1.
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